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                                                                ABSTRACT 
 
What leads people to describe some of their interpersonal relationships as “close” and “warm” 
and others as “distant” and “cold”? Landau, Meier, and Keefer (2010) proposed that 
conceptual metaphors facilitate social cognition by allowing people to use knowledge from a 
relatively concrete (source) domain (e.g., physical distance) in understanding a different, 
usually more abstract (target) concept (e.g., love). We concur that such a notion of metaphors 
can greatly enrich the field of social cognition. At the same time, we believe it is important to 
devote greater theoretical attention to the nature of metaphorical representations in social 
cognition. We believe that Landau et al. place too much emphasis on socio-cognitive 
metaphors as top-down knowledge structures and pay too little attention to the constraints that 
shape metaphors from the bottom up. In the present contribution, we highlight important 
bottom-up constraints, imposed through bodily constraints and social scaffolds. Socio-
cognitive metaphors do not exist just for mental representation but for action as well. We 
discuss the relevance of grounding socio-cognitive metaphors for broader motivational 
purposes. 
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From Perceptual Rags to Metaphoric Riches: 
Bodily, Social, and Cultural Constraints on Socio-Cognitive Metaphors (Comment on 
Landau, Meier, & Keefe, 2010)   
What leads people to describe some of their interpersonal relationships as “close” and 
“warm” and others as “distant” and “cold”? Why are people inclined to place more powerful 
others higher and less powerful others lower in hierarchical structures? What do people mean 
when they had a “heavy” discussion? Why do people refer to morally reprehensible behaviors 
as “dirty”? Are these merely figures of speech? Or is there a deeper psychological 
significance to the connection between abstract constructs and perceptual dimensions such as 
physical distance, temperature, verticality, weight, and cleanliness?  
Questions about the grounding of social cognition in sensorimotor systems have 
become the focus of intense empirical and theoretical efforts in the last decade in psychology 
and other disciplines. Traditionally, theorists have assumed that social perceivers rely on 
abstract, disembodied categories or schemas that structure people’s interpretation of social 
information (e.g., S. T. Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000; Wyer & Srull, 
1989). It has become increasingly apparent, however, that people regularly draw on their 
concrete bodily experiences in constructing social reality (Cohen, Leung, & IJzerman, 2009; 
Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005; Smith & Semin, 2004).  
Building on and extending the aforementioned work, Landau, Meier, and Keefer (2010) 
proposed a metaphor-enriched approach to social cognition. Their new theoretical approach 
treats metaphors as an integral part of the conceptual system that people use to understand 
(not just express) abstract concepts like love, power, or morality through experience. 
Conceptual metaphors may thus allow people to make sense of life’s complexities by 
allowing people to use knowledge from a relatively concrete (source) domain (e.g., physical 
distance) in understanding a different, usually more abstract (target) concept (e.g., love). 
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We concur with Landau, Meier, and Keefer (2010) that the notion of metaphors can 
greatly enrich the field of social cognition. At the same time, we believe that it is important to 
devote greater theoretical attention to the nature of metaphorical representations in social 
cognition. In Landau et al.’s theoretical analysis, socio-cognitive metaphors are "conceptual", 
exerting a top-down influence in structuring information and experience very much like the 
traditional notion of a social-cognitive schema (Smith, 1998). Although we agree that 
providing structure is an important function of socio-cognitive metaphors, recent work 
challenges the notion that these metaphors function like mere schemas.   
Landau et al. (2010) further propose that people individually construct social-cognitive 
metaphors in unique and creative ways. In our view, this proposal underestimates the 
consensual nature of most important social-cognitive metaphors. Moreover, there is growing 
evidence that socio-cognitive metaphors arise from set bodily constraints and from specific 
social interactions, along with cultural affordances. In short, Landau et al. may place too 
much emphasis on socio-cognitive metaphors as top-down knowledge structures and pay too 
little attention to the constraints that shape metaphors from the bottom up.  
Do Socio-Cognitive Metaphors Function Like Abstract Schemas? 
 The traditional schema literature has devoted a great deal of attention to the idea that 
schemas exert a top-down influence on social information processing, by allowing people to 
“go beyond the information given” in making sense of the world (Bruner, 1957; Stapel & 
Koomen, 2000). Although Landau et al.’s (2010) approach differs from classic schema 
models in important respects, their metaphor-enriched approach nevertheless retains an 
emphasis on top-down effects of knowledge structures. Specifically, conceptual metaphors 
are assumed to be “a structured framework for reasoning about, interpreting, and evaluating 
information related to the target concept” (p. 2).  Moreover, metaphoric knowledge is derived 
from source concepts that “represent commonplace, schematic knowledge about the attributes 
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of familiar referents and the relations among those attributes” (p. 2). Conceptual metaphors 
are thus assumed to operate in the same manner and use the same representational format as 
traditional schemas, even if metaphors represent a case in which properties of the “schema” 
are borrowed from a semantically unrelated domain.  
If socio-cognitive metaphors indeed operate like schemas, traditional social-cognitive 
theories about knowledge structures may possibly be applied to them (see Smith, 1998), 
leading to a host of testable hypotheses. For instance, conceptual metaphors may vary in 
temporary versus chronic accessibility and their applicability in a given social situation 
(Higgins, 1996). Like schemas, conceptual metaphors may then also act as energy-saving 
devices by allowing people to quickly get a grasp on abstract notions (see Macrae, Milne, & 
Bodenhausen, 1994). Conceptual metaphors may further influence social cognition 
spontaneously, that is, unintentionally, efficiently, non-consciously, and uncontrollably 
(Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). Indeed, just about every empirical finding that has been 
connected with schemas might, in principle, be applicable to socio-cognitive metaphors. A 
schema-like conception of socio-cognitive metaphors could thus be generative of new 
research.  
Still, the theoretical implications of socio-cognitive metaphors might reach even 
further, if one considers these metaphors from a grounded cognition perspective. Grounded 
cognition “reflects the assumption that cognition is typically grounded in multiple ways, 
including simulations, situated action, and, on occasion, bodily states” (Barsalou, 1999; p. 
619). Grounded cognition theories can readily accommodate top-down effects of “conceptual” 
metaphors on social cognition, without requiring that such metaphors rely on abstract 
information from the source domain. For instance, Barsalou’s (1999) perceptual systems 
theory assumes that perceptual simulation involves the partial running of sensory-motor 
systems in a top-down manner. From this perspective, effects of socio-cognitive metaphors 
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related to “interpersonal warmth” and “heavy discussions” may be due to perceptual 
simulation processes or situated action. If this is correct, the term “conceptual” metaphors 
may be a misnomer for such socio-cognitive metaphors. After all, very pervasive and basic 
socio-cognitive metaphors may have little to do with abstract concepts or schematic 
knowledge.  
One important implication of a grounded cognitive perspective is that the source 
domain from which a socio-cognitive metaphor is derived does not need to be any more 
“schematic” than the target domain to which the metaphor is applied. Lakoff and Johnson's 
(1999) original idea of conceptual metaphors assumes a basic asymmetry between source and 
target domains, such that “the greater inferential complexity of the sensory and motor 
domains gives the metaphors an asymmetric character, with inferences flowing in one 
direction only” (p. 57-58). The effects of some metaphors indeed appear to display such an 
asymmetry. For instance, people more frequently express time in space, than space in time 
(e.g., Friday is far away, or a long vacation). Likewise, research has found that influencing 
participants’ experience of space has a pervasive influence on one’s experience of time, but 
not vice versa (Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008). Such asymmetries may arise because abstract 
conceptualizations of time may be harder to simulate perceptually than space (but see also 
Giddens, 1981; Hassard, 1989).  
 However, when supposed “target” and “source” domains can both be simulated with 
relative ease, the influence of both domains may flow in either direction. Consider the 
empirical findings that warm temperatures (e.g., induced by holding a warm coffee mug) can 
lead people to perceive greater closeness towards and a more sociable judgment of an 
experimenter or a third party (IJzerman & Semin, 2009; Williams & Bargh, 2008a). From the 
latter research, one might infer that temperature is the “concrete” source concept and affection 
is the “abstract” target concept. But is that really the case? Follow-up studies have shown that 
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inducing interpersonal closeness (through manipulations of physical proximity or 
psychological similarity) leads to people to perceive higher ambient temperatures (IJzerman 
& Semin, 2010). These and related findings in other domains (e.g., Zhong & Leonardelli, 
2008; Schneider, Rutjens, Jostmann, & Lakens, 2010; see also Crawford, 2009) indicate that 
socio-cognitive metaphors do not necessarily involve a set relation between a seemingly 
unrelated concrete (source) domain and an abstract (target) concept.  
 Bi-directional influences between metaphorically related domains make little sense if 
one assumes that conceptual metaphors function like schemas. After all, schemas are applied 
to specific situations in a top-down, asymmetrical manner (Smith, 1998), and specific 
situations influence schematic knowledge only in a very slow, incremental fashion (Smith & 
DeCoster, 2000). By contrast, bi-directional influences between metaphorically related 
domains can be easily handled by grounded cognition theories (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; 2008). 
Perceptual simulations may activate elements of an underlying knowledge structure, and there 
is no need to postulate asymmetrical influence between metaphorically related domains.. 
 In short, there may be more to socio-cognitive metaphors than a schema-like 
conceptual mapping between different domains. Indeed, recent findings indicate that 
mappings between conceptual domains such as warmth and interpersonal closeness are bi-
directional. Such findings therefore suggest that socio-cognitive metaphors go beyond 
conceptual metaphorical relations between source and target domains. To fully understand the 
psychological meaning of socio-cognitive metaphors, it is essential to consider the bottom-up 
constraints that are imposed through bodily constraints and social scaffolds, which are 
subsequently provided with top-down organization through cultural scaffolds.  
Bottom-Up Constraints on Conceptual Metaphors 
 How do pervasive socio-cognitive metaphors like “deep feelings,” “high and mighty,”, 
or “dirty tricks” come about? Landau et al. (2010) briefly mention two ways in which people 
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may come up with conceptual metaphors. A first source of socio-cognitive metaphors is the 
ingenuity of the individual, who makes “creative leaps” (p. 18) in conveying the unique 
meanings of personal experience. Although we agree that the human mind is capable of 
impressive creative achievements, we doubt whether individual creativity is the mainspring of 
common socio-cognitive metaphors.  If every individual would uniquely and creatively invent 
his or her own set of metaphors, we would expect people to develop highly idiosyncratic sets 
of metaphors. In fact, however, the research reviewed by Landau et al. reveals a great deal of 
consensus about the kinds of metaphors that people apply to certain phenomena. The 
creativity of individually operating minds thus seems implausible as an account for the 
majority of conceptual metaphors that influence social cognition.  
 A second potential source of socio-cognitive metaphors lies in the domain of 
“scaffolding” theories, which hold that non-metaphoric associations between social and 
bodily experiences form the basis of conceptual metaphors later in life (Mandler, 2004; Piaget 
& Inhelder, 1969; Williams, Huang, & Bargh, 2009). For instance, young children are likely 
to experience states of affection and physical warmth jointly, and this association may form 
the basis of metaphors of interpersonal warmth. The notion of scaffolding resonates with 
Lakoff and Johnson (1999), who suggested that people build immediate conceptual mappings 
via neural connections, inevitably and nonconsciously. Through such processes of 
“conflation” (C. Johnson, 1997), associations between different domains are subsequently 
mapped onto conceptual metaphors. Scaffolding processes are likely to be vital to the analysis 
of socio-cognitive metaphors, through the constraints that scaffolding imposes on the 
formation of these metaphors. Nevertheless, in their metaphor-enriched approach to social 
cognition, Landau et al. (2010) pay relatively little attention to scaffolding. To fill this 
important gap, we take a closer look at bodily constraints and scaffolding processes that may 
give rise to socio-cognitive metaphors. 
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Bodily Constraints 
 From the dawn of the human (and even other mammalian) species to the present day 
and age, social interactions have included physical experiences that have largely remained 
similar. For instance, individuals have experienced close, intimate contact when having 
empathic sex, when giving birth, sharing fluids (such as breast milk, semen, blood), and so 
forth (A. P. Fiske, 1992). Because of the adaptive significance of such experiences, selection 
pressures are likely to have shaped people’s biological systems in a way that they have 
acquired very basic cognitive systems to engage in basic and essential social interactions 
(Caporael, 1997; Damasio, 1999; IJzerman & Semin, 2010).  
 In line with these notions, Bowlby (1969) suggested that people at birth already 
possess certain systems of “building bricks” that are “activated by stimuli falling within one 
or more broad ranges, (are) terminated by stimuli falling within other broad ranges, and (are) 
strengthened or weakened by stimuli of yet other kinds” (p. 265). Bowlby (1969) mentioned 
touch and clinging as examples of such stimuli – which include a basic association with 
physical warmth. Such building bricks are likely to have been formed out of people’s bonding 
experiences (care-giving, intercourse, sharing of food), which have remained relatively 
constant throughout multiple generations. These physical experiences may include a variety 
of stimuli, such as light physical touch, communal eating, and proximity of others. Other 
examples may include dominance or submission displays, which are also homologous to 
animal behavioral systems (see e.g., Mignault & Chaudhuri, 2003). In the present article, we 
focus specifically on physical warmth, as one of the most well-researched embodiments of 
social relationships.  
The repeated associations between physical warmth and affection might have caused a 
very basic connection that is innate or at least easily learned (Caporael, 1997; Cohen & 
Leung, 2009; Damasio, 1999; A. P. Fiske, 2004; IJzerman & Semin, 2010). Indeed, 
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converging lines of evidence support the basic biological significance of the link between 
physical warmth and affection. For instance, Harlow (1958) showed that young monkeys 
preferred a soft surrogate mother made of terrycloth to a surrogate that was made of wire. 
Monkeys raised with a wire mother (as compared to the terrycloth mother) had more trouble 
digesting milk and suffered from diarrhea more frequently. Harlow’s (1958) work suggested 
that close, physical contact (which often includes a basic association with warmth) throughout 
infancy was necessary for healthy psychological functioning. 
 In a related vein, Fransson, Karlsson, and Nilsson’s (2005) found provocative 
evidence that when a baby was held by the mother, the mean difference between core and skin 
temperature is much lower than when the baby was in its cot. Maternal touch may be thus 
vital in preventing hypothermia, a major cause of death among neonates. Additional work 
suggests that oxytocin, a hormone that regulates positive social exchanges plays a key role in 
thermoregulation (Uvnäs-Moberg, 1998). For instance, Kasahara and colleagues (2007) 
showed that oxytocin-deficient mice have impaired abilities to regulate temperature (and 
specifically, resistance to colder temperatures). Finally, infants whose mother received 
oxytocin during labor had a significantly higher scalp temperature during birth than those in 
comparable control groups (Beck, Flowers, & Blair, 1979).  
The link between physical warmth and social affection is thus deeply grounded in the 
biological architecture of the human (and mammalian) body. Socio-cognitive metaphors about 
warmth-as-affection are therefore far from arbitrary personal or cultural inventions. Instead, 
such metaphors are likely to be built or “scaffolded” onto basic bodily experiences of the 
intrinsic relation between physical warmth and social affection. From this perspective, there is 
no need for schematic knowledge about the attributes of physical warmth to become 
“transferred” to the “semantically unrelated” domain of affection. Rather, metaphors about 
warmth-as-affection are more likely to be reflective of experiences during social interaction 
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and associated thermoregulatory processes, which are simulated or re-enacted when people 
are thinking or talking about social interactions.  
Social Scaffolds as Extensions of the Body 
Through its intrinsic relation with social affection, physical warmth becomes part of 
the fabric of people's social relationships. The type of relationship in which warmth is most 
relevant is what Alan Page Fiske (1991, 1992, 2004) has referred to as a communal sharing 
relationship, an altruistic relationship that is typically found among close kin. Communal 
sharing relationships are created and marked through physical actions that create a perception 
of a merged social body. Communal sharing relationships rely on a feeling of oneness 
between people and are formed through bonding experiences that connect the body, like 
touch, sharing fluids (i.e. breast milk, semen, blood), empathic sex, synchronous movement, 
and nursing. A. P. Fiske (1992) has argued that communal sharing relationships are grounded 
in innate and evolved mechanisms, or relational models, that allow people to coordinate social 
interaction.  
In addition to communal sharing, A. P. Fiske (1992) identifies three relational models 
that can be universally found across cultures and are likely to be grounded in innate biological 
mechanisms. First, relationships based on authority ranking focus on ordered differences and 
allow people to know relative position in a linear hierarchy. Second, relationships based on 
equality matching lead people to monitor additive differences in order to maintain balance. 
These relationships are typified by interactions characterized by reciprocity, turn-taking, and 
so forth. Third, relationships based on market pricing lead people to use abstract ratios to 
compare otherwise non-comparable commodities (e.g. exchanging relatively arbitrary 
amounts of money for products). Of the four relational models, communal sharing, authority 
ranking, and equality matching relationships are based on very concrete interactions that 
involve bodily representations. Market pricing relationships, on the other hand, are constituted 
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primarily out of abstract, symbolic representations (primarily numbers, semantic language, 
and money), and seem to have primarily evolved with human mammals (A. P. Fiske, 2004).  
 Relational models are important for social cognition, because they allow people to 
achieve a consensus in constructing their conceptual experience. Such very basic relational 
structures allow for a rich, but coordinated, manner of dealing with one’s social environment. 
For instance, communal sharing relationships are grounded not only in physical warmth 
(IJzerman & Semin, 2010), but also in experiences like physical distance (Williams & Bargh, 
2008b) and synchrony (Hove & Risen, 2009; Lakens, 2010; Paladino, Mazzurega, Pavani, & 
Schubert, 2010). Relational structures like communal sharing relationships are mapped onto 
basic bodily systems, such as physical warmth, that are innately motivating and meaningful. 
Relational models may explain why some “social meanings are likely to be culturally wide-
spread or universal” (Landau et al., 2010, p. 17).  
Relational models may also explain individual differences in the meaning of socio-
cognitive metaphors. Attachment theorists have shown that, from early interactions with 
caregivers, children develop generalized internal working models (which are critical in both 
infancy and adulthood; cf. Bowlby, 1969) on how to behave towards self and others. These 
working models are based on the reliability of the caregiver. Differences in the reliability of 
such meaningful relationships may give rise to substantial individual differences in internal 
working models of attachment, or attachment styles (cf. Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 
1978). Securely attached infants expect attachment figures to be available and are easily 
comforted when upset. By contrast, insecurely attached infants do not share these hopeful 
expectations. Among adults, secure attachment also provides a foundation for compassion and 
care-giving (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2005).  
If the link between warmth and affection is grounded in innate relational models, then 
we would expect this link to be moderated by individual differences in attachment style. 
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Individuals who are securely attached may learn to associate feelings of warmth with the 
availability of loving relationships. By contrast, individuals who are insecurely attached may 
not have an association between warmth and affection, because for them, this association has 
not been enforced by their caregivers. In line with these ideas, IJzerman, Karremans, 
Thomsen, and Schubert (2010) found that attachment style moderates the effects of physical 
warmth on prosocial behavior. Specifically, securely attached children became more prosocial 
in warm (as compared to cold) conditions. However, this effect was absent amongst 
insecurely attached children. Importantly, both securely attached children and insecurely 
attached children were more generous toward their friends as compared to strangers, showing 
that at an abstract level, both groups of children were able to conceptualize the nature of the 
relationship. The innately motivating physical cues interacted with the children’s internal 
models of attachment. These findings provide initial support for the idea that socio-cognitive 
metaphors like interpersonal warmth are grounded or “scaffolded” onto people's relational 
models. 
Cultural Scaffolding: Conventional (Dis)Agreements 
Bodily constraints and relational models may explain why some socio-cognitive 
metaphors have emerged universally across cultures. However, as Landau and colleagues 
(2010) point out, socio-cognitive metaphors can also be culturally specific. Such cultural 
variations in socio-cognitive metaphors may emerge in a variety of ways. 
A first source of cultural variations in socio-cognitive metaphors is formed by 
differences in cultural norms on the basis of core cognitive structures. For example, consider 
Zhong and Liljenquist’s (2006) findings that show how people alleviate negative feelings 
about moral transgressions by washing their hands. These findings attest to a link between 
physical (concrete) and moral (abstract) disgust, which has been suggested to be universal. On 
top of the seemingly universal link between physical and moral disgust, there appear to exist 
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clear cultural variations: Cohen and Leung (2009) discuss findings that making hand washing 
movements produces greater condemnation of blasphemy and belief violations among 
Muslims and Protestants, as compared to Hindus and Jews. For Muslims and Protestants, 
there is a greater emphasis on beliefs as compared to deeds. Violating one’s beliefs is thus 
considered impure for Muslims and Protestants, and at odds with physical cleanliness (as 
implied by hand washing). By contrast, Hindus and Jews place greater emphasis on deeds 
than beliefs, and therefore react less strongly to the incongruence between physical 
cleanliness and belief violations. These findings suggest that conceptually separate abstract 
cultural schemas are mapped onto very concrete experiences of disgust.  
A second source of cultural variations in socio-cognitive metaphors involves cultural 
differences in basic and subtle interactions (see also Bourdieu, 1977). People might develop 
certain bodily “techniques,” which are built on similar types of basic bodily constraints and 
socially coordinated structures. Consider the findings that upright and dominant postures may 
universally be recognized as postures of pride (Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008). The content of 
pride and shame differs across cultures (Cohen, 2003). IJzerman and Cohen (2010) observed 
that differences in the understanding of shame and pride are literally embodied: Latino 
American males put in a straight up posture will put greater emphasis on values of male 
reputation, female purity, and familism (closely tied to expressions of shame and pride; 
Rodriguez, Mosquera, Fischer, & Manstead, 2002), as compared to a slouched, hangdog 
posture. Anglo-American males do not show similar embodiment effects. These effects, 
IJzerman and Cohen (2010) showed, are mapped on bodily postures bi-directionally. There 
are relatively few socio-cognitive metaphors available in language to describe such complex 
cultural norms (although one may think of “holding one’s head high”). People presumably 
have learned basic cultural norms through relatively simple interactions (such as dominance 
contests, grounded in core systems of authority ranking relationships). Instead of creating 
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conceptual structure, the majority of the socio-cognitive metaphors that may be constructed 
on the basis of such cultural norms seem to be reflective of the experience.   
Finally, a third source of cultural variations in socio-cognitive metaphors is the 
ingenuity of certain individuals, who make “creative leaps” (p. 18). This third source seems 
most compatible with Landau et al.’s (2010) ideas about metaphoric transfer. Indeed, not all 
cultural schemas are based on commonly coordinated structures. Specific types of socio-
cognitive metaphors arbitrarily relate concrete experiences to abstract target concepts. For 
instance, Maass and Russo (2003) show that conventions such as writing direction profoundly 
influence the way people perceive action. Europeans perceive an action that flows from left to 
right as more agentic, whereas speakers of Arab (who use a reversed writing direction) 
perceive an action that flows from right to left as more agentic. Such cultural embodiments 
might have developed randomly (so-called totem embodiments; Cohen & Leung, 2009), and 
might have been reaffirmed through subtle forms of cultural imitation throughout history, 
causing major behavioral differences (Richerson & Boyd, 2005). These types of experiences 
can give a top-down structure to experience, much as Landau et al. describe. Indeed, it seems 
hard to imagine that the effects Maass and Russo (2003) describe would operate bi-
directionally: how could one change Europeans’ writing direction by having them persistently 
perceive an action from right-to-left? 
Taken together, there may be at least three different sources of culturally specific 
socio-cognitive metaphors. First, socio-cognitive metaphors may arise out of clearly 
articulated sets of cultural norms that lead people to utilize their core cognitive systems in 
extremely specific ways. Second, socio-cognitive metaphors may emerge from culturally 
habituated embodied interactions. Third, socio-cognitive metaphors may be relatively 
arbitrary sets of cultural conventions (so-called “totem embodiments”).  Socio-cognitive 
metaphors can thus be constructed from the bottom up (on the basis of very core cognitive 
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systems) in combination with top-down knowledge structures that are “given” by the context, 
either through semantic or non-semantic representations. Conversely, socio-cognitive 
metaphors may be constructed arbitrarily, through creative leaps by individuals, conceptually 
unrelated to the specific embodied representation. In order to fully understand the 
psychological meaning of socio-cognitive metaphors, it is essential to consider the interplay 
between such top-down influences with their bottom-up constraints. 
Conclusions and Outlook: Conceptualizing Socio-Cognitive Metaphors 
What leads people to describe their social reality in terms of physical qualities like 
temperature, verticality, weight, or cleanliness? Landau et al. (2010) have argued 
convincingly that these socio-cognitive metaphors are reflective of basic processes that allow 
people to make sense of the world. However, from a grounded cognition perspective, the 
psychological significance of socio-cognitive metaphors goes beyond mental representation 
and language. At least some socio-cognitive metaphors seem to have a universal meaning that 
is grounded in bodily constraints, and relational schemas that are rooted in ancient 
mammalian brain structures. Other socio-cognitive metaphors vary across cultures, but still 
seem to emerge from specific cultural differences in embodiment.  
Grounding socio-cognitive metaphors may be particularly helpful in elucidating their 
motivational significance. Many of the most widely used socio-cognitive metaphors are about 
matters that people care about deeply and passionately, such as love, power, morality, and the 
self. From a grounded cognition perspective, this is no coincidence. Indeed, socio-cognitive 
metaphors are likely to build directly on the needs and motives that people seek to realize in 
their social worlds. Socio-cognitive metaphors thus do not exist just for the sake of mental 
representation but also for action. Indeed, what makes metaphors meaningful may be directly 
tied to what motivates people. For instance, being physically and psychologically close to 
others may be particularly important in times of existential threat (Wisman & Koole, 2003), 
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and thinking about the self as powerful may be particularly important as people are getting 
ready to use physical force (Schubert & Koole, 2009). A grounded cognition perspective may 
thus explain the enduring psychological appeal of socio-cognitive metaphors. 
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